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Every new truth passes through three stages. In the beginning the ex-
perts ridicule it as “nonsense.” Then they dismiss it as “trivial.” And in 
the end we learn that they “said it all along.”  
 
Attributed, in various versions, to  
Arthur Schopenhauer, Arthur C. Clarke and Leo Szilard 
 
In his recent review of The Global Political Economy of Israel (JPS 33:2, Winter 2004), 
Professor Baruch Kimmerling seems unsure whether our book is nonsense or some-
thing he has been saying all along. On the one hand, he states that “all the explana-
tory power” of our approach “collapses” in the face of recent events. On the other 
hand, he admits that ours is one of the “most interesting” volumes he has read in a 
decade – albeit one that had been “preceded” by the work of others, primarily his 
own. 
Over the past couple of years, our book has been reviewed in numerous journals, 
magazines and newspapers. Most were highly complimentary, some very critical. So 
far, we have not responded, even to those who evidently misunderstood our work. 
But this review is different. In fact, it is not a review, but a personal attack which de-
liberately misinforms the reader. Clearly, it deserves a response.  
 
“Methodologists! Get to work!” 
According to Professor Kimmerling, much of our work is conveniently borrowed 
from others without due attribution. Specifically, we “consistently omit or marginal-
ize important research” by others whom he mentions, and “whose similar ap-
proaches, arguments and findings preceded this book” (p. 120). “These omissions,” 
Professor Kimmerling continues, “convey a pretense to originality” but, unfortu-
nately, “only lessen the credibility of the book and weaken its arguments” (pp. 
120-1). 
Naturally, one “major omission” involves Professor Kimmerling’s own work. 
Apparently, our book mentions but glosses over the crucial redistribution among 
Israel’s ruling class of land and capital during the early years of the state. Our “ex-
cuse,” he says, is official secrecy, but that excuse does not hold much water; indeed, 
it merely betrays our ignorance of his own work, and specifically of Zionism and Terri-
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tory (1983) and Zionism and Economy (1983), where much of the data on this redistri-
bution are readily available.  
These claims are ludicrous, to put it politely.  
In our book, we argue that Israel’s ruling class emerged and evolved along with 
the process of capital accumulation, globally and locally. During the early years of 
the state, the local ruling class consolidated itself through the highly differential redis-
tribution of three major “prizes”: the lands taken from the Palestinians in 1948; the 
inflow of capital, primarily from Jewish donations, German reparation payments 
and grants and loans from the United States; and the post-1948 influx of a new im-
migrant labour force. The following decades stood in the shadow of the Cold War 
and the welfare-warfare state. Local capital accumulation and ruling class formation 
thrived on high military spending, intense stagflation and complete dependence on 
the United States. The recent emergence of “globalization” again transformed Israeli 
capitalism – this time toward transnational ownership and neoliberal ideology. Fi-
nally, we note that the neoliberal period may be drawing to a close, to be replaced by 
heightened global conflict and renewed stagflation. 
Each of these periods, we claim, was marked by its own power processes, which, 
in turn, were reflected in the patterns of “differential accumulation” by dominant 
capital groups, local and global. Our purpose in the book is to articulate, theoretically 
and empirically, the multiple facets of this process.  
The research for this book, which started when we were students in the early 
1980s, was both frustrating and thankless. Everywhere we turned, we bumped into 
closed doors. Archives suddenly became “inaccessible.” Officials refused to talk. Re-
search granting agencies laughed at our funding proposals. We faced orchestrated 
attempts to fail our MA thesis (Nitzan) and PhD dissertation (Bichler). Most aca-
demic journals would not even consider our submissions. For years, we were unable 
to secure even a temporary university position, and it was largely by fluke that one of 
us managed to find a permanent university job. 
But the process had its upsides. We learned important lessons that academia 
would never teach you. We acquired critical insights into empirical and theoretical 
work. We invented new disaggregated techniques to break the macro front window 
that so effectively conceals the underlying realities of power. We shed new light on 
processes which standard theories consider anomalous. And, eventually, we began to 
develop a new political economy based on the notion of “differential accumulation” 
and its different regimes. This new political economy not only intertwines the proc-
esses of ruling class formation and differential capital accumulation, but also ties to-
gether seemingly unrelated  social phenomena, including corporate mergers and 
globalization, stagflation and growth, militarization and war, high-tech cycles and 
international relations, and ideological shifts and regime changes, among others. 
Some of the material in our book had previously appeared in articles and mono-
graphs, beginning with Israel’s Aristocracy of Finance (Tel Aviv: Cadim,1984), the first 
published history of the country’s robber barons, and with “Some Aspects of Aggre-
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gate Concentration in the Israeli Economy, 1964-1986” (1988), the first statistical 
analysis of Israeli differential accumulation. 
Contrary to Professor Kimmerling’s claims, nothing resembling this work has 
ever been done before. The people whom he mentions have never presented “similar 
approaches, arguments or findings.” And his own two books, beside the subject of 
Israel, share nothing with our own work. Yet Professor Kimmerling insists that “he 
said it all along.” 
To be novel means to negate existing categories, to develop fresh theories, to 
come up with innovative methodologies, to present new types of data and facts. Pro-
fessor Kimmerling Zionism and Territory and Zionism and Economy offer nothing of the 
sort. These books are written in dry academic language. They tell us little which is 
really new about Zionist history. And although dressed in “politically correct” jar-
gon, they remain deeply anchored in the conservative Israeli sociology of “nation 
building” popular during the Cold War.  
Professor Kimmerling informs us that the data on the redistribution of land and 
capital are available in these books. And, indeed, the two volumes overflow with 
facts and tables. Unfortunately, most of these data, having been copied “as is” from 
official statistical sources, add little to what we already know. Nevertheless, we de-
cided to read these books once more, just to be sure. This time, we searched specifi-
cally for information on who received which Palestinian lands and who got what portion of 
the capital inflow. We found no such information. Perhaps Professor Kimmerling 
could help us with the page numbers. 
In the meantime – his fury notwithstanding – the original claim made on page 97 
of our book continues to hold true: “. . . till this very day there is not even a single 
empirical study, Zionist or post-Zionist, to tell us who got what, when and how. As 
C. Wright Mills put it: “Methodologists! Get to Work!”  
 
A different kind of book 
As stated in the introductory chapter, the goal of our book is not simply to describe 
the “case of Israel,” but to use Israel as a prism through which to rethink global capi-
talism more broadly. Professor Kimmerling and his colleagues have shown little in-
terest in this question, so, naturally, we saw little reason to deal with them. Our main 
concern was Marxism.  
These days, few seem to remember that Marx’s value theory tried to articulate a 
“quantitative architecture” of capitalism centered around the accumulation of capi-
tal. This theory excited generations of followers. Yet, having been built largely 
around the process of production, it was progressively undermined by the new poli-
tics of big business, the ascent of the capitalist state and the emergence of modern 
finance. The consequence was a deep crisis in classical Marxism, whose decline 
opened the door to structural Marxism and, eventually, to postmodernism and anti-
science charlatans.  
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But not everyone took the easy way out. Some, such as Thorstein Veblen, Pierro 
Sraffa, Michal Kalecki, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy and, more recently, writers of 
the regulation and social structures of accumulation schools, tried to come to terms 
with this crisis and seriously rethink capitalism. We debate these thinkers and offer 
the beginning of an alternative theory of capitalist development.  
Contrary to the title of Professor Kimmerling’s review, our book is not about 
“economics” – revisionist or otherwise. Indeed, we reject the very separation between 
“economy,” “state,” “society” and “culture,” and instead suggest a unified political 
economy. At the centre of this political economy lies a theory that views capital as the 
“commodification of power.” Based on this theory, which is both dialectical and 
quantitative, we develop a totally new history of Middle East wars; a new history of 
stagflation; a new history of high-tech cycles and financial bubbles; and a new under-
standing of globalization.  
Although most Israeli writers have had little to say about these processes, a select 
few did make seminal contributions which we have not failed to notice. These writ-
ers include Akiva Orr and Moshé Machover, whose book Peace, Peace and There Is No 
Peace (1961) –  the very best volume on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – was banned 
by the Israeli Censor. Another is Emmanuel Farjoun, whose path-breaking work on 
the Israeli-Palestinian dual labour market, written in the late 1970s, we found inspi-
rational (pp. 120-121). A third was Esther Alexander, the only Israeli economist to 
tell the truth about the redistributional nature of inflation (pp. 158-160). Most of 
these writers were not academics. Many were active in the Anti-Zionist Left at a time 
when such activity was considered treasonous. Some suffered unemployment, abject 
poverty and even imprisonment. Others were forced to leave the country. The 2001 
Hebrew edition of our book, From War Profits to Peace Dividends, was dedicated to 
these brave men and women, whose arguments indeed preceded our work and in-
spired our research.  
  
The centre of the world 
Professor Kimmerling concludes his review by observing that, in the final analysis, 
our theory falls flat on its face. “How is it possible,” he asks, that “such a supposedly 
omnipotent money-power coalition [i.e., Israel’s dominant capital] was unable to put 
an end to the damaging conflict [i.e. the second intifada] by forcing the state to dis-
mantle the settlements in the occupied territories and withdraw to the 1967 borders?” 
(p. 122) 
In his opinion, the answer is simple. The Palestinian uprising – and by exten-
sion, the invasion of Afghanistan and the conquest of Iraq – simply have little to do 
with the history of capitalism and the logic of accumulation. Their reasons were en-
tirely different. “As with all deterministic materialist approaches,” he explains, “the 
present volume is blind to such issues as political culture, symbols, national and reli-
gious sentiments, and the various ways in which these interact with each other on 
both sides of the conflict.” Clearly, “without including these forms of human behav-
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ior in the analysis, the theoretical framework suffers from limited and very partial 
explanatory power and even less predictive power” (ibid). 
Apparently, for the non-deterministic immaterialist sociologist, “reality” is con-
stituted by the racist/ethnic press. Since Ariel Sharon and Yassir Arafat fill the news, 
it must be true that the history of Israel is determined by the Likud caucus and the 
Israeli settlers on the one hand, and by the Palestinian National Assembly and 
Hamas on the other (“both sides of the conflict”).  
Unfortunately, the fact that we “see” the sun circling the earth does not prove 
Galileo wrong. To understand the global political economy of the Middle East, we 
need to go a little bit beyond the media’s immediate preoccupation with religion, 
racism and cultural symbols. And it is here that Professor Kimmerling seems to have 
missed our point altogether.  
The whole of Chapter 2 is devoted to the long-term pendulum of differential ac-
cumulation which swings between relatively peaceful expansion through corporate 
mergers and proletarianization (breadth) and violent redistribution through stagfla-
tion and conflict (depth). This framework is anything but deterministic, and its ex-
planatory power is robust, to say the least. Indeed, it allows us not only to explain 
previous Middle East “energy conflicts,” but also to predict the most recent one 
(Palestine/Afghanistan/Iraq). Professor Kimmerling may have read the book, but he 
surely failed to understand it.2 
Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians, although religious-ethnic in appearance, is 
now fueled by a significant shift in the nature of global accumulation, a shift that Is-
raelis and Palestinians can neither influence nor avoid. In the past, Israel’s dominant 
capital managed to ride the global politics of accumulation. During the 1970s and 
1980s, it thrived on the global regime of “war profits,” and in the 1990s it reaped the 
“peace dividends” of global neoliberalism. But as we explain in the final chapter of 
our book, neoliberalism also transformed the very nature of the Israeli elite, which, 
“by endorsing transnationalization, made itself subservient to broader processes over 
which it had no control” (p. 356). Perhaps that is why many of Israel’s leading capi-
talists have diversified their assets to such an extent that, today, whatever happens in 
Israel only marginally affects their global “portfolio.” Professor Kimmerling and 
Prime Minister Sharon may believe otherwise, but their country has long ceased to 
be the centre of the world. 
 
2 Our various arguments and predictions on this subject are confirmed in two recent papers 
which bring our work up to date: “Dominant Capital and the New Wars,” Journal of World-
Systems Research 10:2, Summer 2004, and “Differential Accumulation and Middle East Wars: 
Beyond Neo-Liberalism,” in Global Regulation. Managing Crises After the Imperial Turn, edited by 
D. Wigan, L. Assassi and K. van der Pijl (London: Palgrave, 2004). 
